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Abstract
We study to what extent identiﬁcation does matter for trustfulness
and trustworthiness to emerge in a population of players. Our experimen-
tal protocol is designed for isolating the eﬀects of trustees’ identiﬁcation.
Trustees’ identiﬁcation is a necessary condition for introducing a reputa-
tion mechanism. We run three treatments. In each treatment groups 6
players interact repeatedly and randomly and play a 30 periods invest-
ment game (Berg & al. 1995). In the ﬁrst treatment players can’t identify
each other, in the second one players can identify each other as trustee and
in the third one players identify each other both as trustee and trustor.
We show that, according to the expectation, trustees’ identiﬁcation has a
positive eﬀect on reciprocity. However it doesn’t aﬀect the average trust in
the population. Trust is signiﬁcantly higher than in the complete anony-
mous treatment only when players identify each other in both roles. We
show that this enhance of trust is the result of mutual trust-reciprocity
relationships formation.
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11 Introduction
It has been claimed since Arrow (1974) that trust plays a key role in any eco-
nomic transactions, because of asymmetric information, contract incomplete-
ness, prohibitive monitoring costs, etc. Moreover, Fukuyama (1995) tried to
argue that the level of trust at the society level determines its overall perfor-
mance, a conjecture that is supported by several empirical studies (La Porta
& al. 1997, Glaeser & al. 2000, Knack & Keefer 1997). At the society level,
trust plays precisely the role of “lubricant of relations” suggested by Arrow, a
role that is essential when individuals interact in large populations, where en-
counters are random and agents have the opportunity to accumulate experience
both as trustor and as trustee. Features such as population size, repeatedness
and randomness of interactions, and joint experience as trustor and trustee,
are fundamental for studying the eﬀects and evolution of trust in a society.
To a large extend trust is endogenous, because people interact repeatedly and
randomly in large populations, and their behavior becomes determined by the
history of their past interactions. This important fact was already mentioned
in the seminal experimental paper by Berg & al. (1995) who showed that in-
forming subjects about the frequencies of trust and reciprocity levels in past
experiments, increases the level of trust.
In such an environment a key determinant of trust is the identiﬁcation of the
people with whom agents interact. In most circumstances, interactions are not
anonymous and agents can remember the outcome of past interactions. Even in
the larger market place, Internet, on almost all commercial websites people must
provide personal information for subscribing. For example a valid email address
must be provided as personal identiﬁcation, as for example on the eBay auction’s
website. Buyers are therefore able to identify each seller with whom they inter-
act and remember past issues of their common interaction. Such identiﬁcation
systems of trustees’ is likely to enhance reciprocity among agents involved in
mutual exchange, and indirectly aﬀects the level of trust in society. Reputation
is the key variable in these systems. A trustee who knows that his decisions are
individually observed is likely to be more reciprocal. The trustee’s history of
play towards a particular trustor is a central information for that trustor, who
might rely on past records for his future decisions towards the same trustee. A
trustee with a bad individual reputation with respect to a given trustor is likely
to be not trusted. Therefore, in a population environment, trustees’ identiﬁca-
tion creates individual incentives to be trustworthy for building up and keeping
a “good” reputation and hence, expecting to be trusted in the future. Knowing
trustees’ individual interest trustors may become more trustful. We therefore
conjecture that the level of trust within the population is enhanced by trustees’
identiﬁcation.
Most trust-based experiments have dealt with pair-wise ﬁxed interactions. Start-
ing with a one-shot interaction, Berg & al. (1995) showed that most experimen-
tal subjects do not play the subgame perfect equilibrium solution. Most trustors
exhibit trusting behavior and most trustees tend to reciprocate. While these
ﬁndings raise deep questions about game theoretic predictions, they also raise
questions about the features of trust relations that can be captured in the lab.
Several experiments also introduced explicitly repeated interactions in the in-
2vestment game (see Cochard & al. 2004, Anderhub & al. 2002) to study the
evolution of trust. Their main ﬁnding is that repeated interactions have a posi-
tive eﬀect both on the level of trust and the level of reciprocity. These eﬀects are
predicted both by repeated game eﬀects (reputation building) and by reciprocal
behavior (trustees rewards higher trust with higher reciprocity). While these
experiments take a step into the direction of letting trust relations emerge in a
more realistic social interaction setting, most of them were based on repeated
pair-wise interactions in a partner design. While they allow taking into account
the eﬀect of one’s own past interactions, they neglect randomness of interac-
tions within a large population of players. Furthermore, in real life situations;
most people have experience both as trustor and as trustee, depending on the
situation in which they are currently involved. Playing both roles has been in-
vestigated by Burks & al. (2002), who found that trust and reciprocity are lower
when subjects play both roles in a one-shot investment game. To our knowledge
the only experiment that combines repeated interactions in a large population
with both roles was run by Murphy & al. (2006). Their experiment is based on
a real-time centipede game with a random assignment of each subject to a new
group after each round. Each subject could end the game at any time. Subjects
were therefore both in a position to trust other subjects and to be trusted by
others. While Murphy & al.’s experiment captures most of the central features
of trust relations within a population, subjects do not have to take an explicit
decision to trust other players. Furthermore there is no opportunity for recip-
rocating trusting decisions in this game.
Our aim in this paper is to try to capture the main features of trust relations
within a population of players : repetition, random encounters and playing both
roles with a “rich” strategy space. We do this by letting each subject play si-
multaneously both roles in the investment game over 30 periods. In each period,
each subject is randomly paired with a trustor and with a trustee. We focus
on the eﬀects of identiﬁcation, by letting subjects have permanent access to
their history record of past interactions. In our experimental design history can
matter only at the individual level. Depending on the treatment, subjects can
accumulate knowledge about the level of trust and trustworthiness of subjects
with whom they interacted with in past periods. The experiment is designed
to investigate the eﬀect of trustees’ identiﬁcation on trust and reciprocity. In
a population environment trustees’ identiﬁcation is a necessary condition for a
reputation mechanism to be implemented. Following Kreps & al.’s arguments,
trustees’ identiﬁcation may be suﬃcient to enhance trust and reciprocity com-
pared to an environment with anonymous players. When players interact re-
peatedly in ﬁxed pairs, identiﬁcation is exogenous, because players know that
they will interact repeatedly with one another and that they can observe the his-
tory of past interactions. With random encounters in a large population, things
are more complicated, because trustors can accumulate information about each
trustee only if they are able to identify them, i.e. to recognize a trustee with
whom he has already interacted. Hence, the key questions investigated in this
paper are the following: (i) to what extend does trustees’ identiﬁcation in a
population aﬀect trust and reciprocity?, (ii) does trustors’ identiﬁcation has
any impact on the levels of trust and reciprocity? Adding trustors’ identiﬁca-
tion implies that individuals are also able to identify who trusts them. Both
roles identiﬁcation thus provides players with more information about each other
3and also with a stronger control on the others’ decisions. Indeed, a player i that
trusts a player j is likely to expect that player j trusts him too. If not, he may
stop his trusting behavior. The same reasoning hold for reciprocity. Moreover in
this environment individuals can form bilateral trust-reciprocity relationships.
Our conjecture is that identiﬁcation of player in both roles lead to higher levels
of trust and reciprocity in the population than trustees’ identiﬁcation only.
In order to answer the two questions and to test our conjectures we run three
treatments : complete anonymity, private identiﬁcation of trustee’s role and
private identiﬁcation of both roles. Our main ﬁndings can be summarized as
follows : private identiﬁcation of trustee’s role increases reciprocity, adding pri-
vate identiﬁcation of trustor’s role increases the average level of trust. However,
trustees’ role identiﬁcation alone has no eﬀect on trust and adding trustors’
identiﬁcation has no additional eﬀect on reciprocity. Furthermore we ﬁnd a
strong correlation between own trust and own reciprocity independently of the
treatment, between received amount and own reciprocity under trustee’s role
identiﬁcation, and between received amount and own trust under identiﬁca-
tion of both roles. Finally we ﬁnd that the higher trust levels observed under
both roles identiﬁcation can be attributed to the emergence of bilateral trust-
reciprocity relationships within the population.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
experimental design, section 3 presents the results, at the group level and at the
individual level, and section 4 concludes.
2 Experimental design
Experimental sessions were organized at LEEM, the experimental lab of Mont-
pellier. 108 student subjects, from various faculties, participated in the experi-
ment. Subjects were randomly selected from a pool of volunteers. None of the
recruited subjects had ever participated in an experiment on social dilemma.
Each subject was randomly assigned to a group of 6 participants. We run three
diﬀerent treatments, with 6 independent groups per treatment. Upon arriving at
the experimental lab subjects received written instructions1. After reading the
instructions subjects answered a short questionnaire (on the computer screen)
to check their understanding.
Subjects participated in a repeated investment game (Berg & al. 1995), played
for 30 periods, in which they simultaneously played both roles (trustor and
trustee). In each period each subject had to take a decision as trustor and a
decision as trustee. In each period, each subject in a group was randomly paired
with a trustor selected among the ﬁve other group members, and with a trustee
selected in the same way. Treatments diﬀer with respect to the identiﬁcation of
players in the population.
In the NI treatment (No Identiﬁcation) identiﬁcation of players is not possible.
Subjects who take a trusting decision only know that an anonymous player X
will receive three times the amount sent. Conversely, subjects acting as trustees
1Instructions are available on the website http://www.duboishome.info/dimitri/index.
php?page=publications&lang=eng
4NI TI TTI
Investment 3.76 4.14 4.98
Reciprocitya (%) 19.78 25.41 24.87
Average net payoﬀ as trustorb -1.45 -0.54 -0.49
Average net payoﬀ as trusteeb 8.97 8.81 10.45
Average ﬁnal paymentc 15.77 16.45 17.96
a Calculated only for positive sendings,
b in ecus,
c in euros.
Table 1: Averages for each treatment
only know that the received amount comes from an anonymous player Y . Sub-
jects know that X and Y are members of their group but are unable to identify
them. In the TI treatment (Trustees’ Identiﬁcation) subjects acting as trustee
are identiﬁed by a letter. Before taking their decision, subjects acting as trustor
are informed with which subject (B, C, D, E or F) they will be interacting with.
Each letter identiﬁes only one subject in the group and each subject keeps the
same letter for the whole session. Notice that the identity of the trustee remains
private information, and that all subjects had exactly the same instructions. Fi-
nally, in the TTI treatment (Trustors’ and Trustees’ Identiﬁcation) each subject
is identiﬁed by a unique letter, B, C, D, E or F. Before taking his trusting de-
cision each trustor knows with which trustee he is paired with, and also knows
from which of the trustees he will eventually receive some currency.
Endowments and gains are measured in ECUs (Experimental Currency Unit)
with the conversion rate, 1 ECU = 0.03 euros, stated in the instructions. In
each treatment subjects have access to a history screen providing information
about past period decisions : the amount sent and returned in their trustor
role, the amount received and returned in their trustee role, the gain of the
period and the cumulative gain since the beginning of the experiment. In the
TI treatment an additional column displays the letter of the trustee with whom
a subject is interacting. In the TTI treatment there are two additional columns,
one identifying the trustor and another one identifying the trustee.
3 Results
3.1 General results
Table 1 reports average data for the three treatments: the average investment
level, average reciprocity (in percentage of the (positive) received amount), the
average net proﬁt as trustor (calculated as the average of the diﬀerence between
the amount sent and the amount returned by the trustee) and the average net
proﬁt as trustee (calculated as the average of the diﬀerence between the amount
received and the amount returned).
Result 1:
(i) Trustees’ identiﬁcation signiﬁcantly increases the average level of
reciprocity but not the average level of trust compared to the bench-
mark.
(ii) Both roles identiﬁcation signiﬁcantly increases both the average





































Figure 1: Evolution of reciprocity for each treatment
levels of reciprocity and trust compared to the benchmark. Compared
to trustees’ identiﬁcation only (TI), the average level of trust is sig-
niﬁcantly larger.
The average trust in the NI treatment (3.76) is lower than in the TI treatment
(4.14), which is also lower than in the TTI treatment (4.98). The comparison
between the NI and the TI treatment does not reveal any signiﬁcant diﬀerence
in the average level of trust (Mann Whitney Unilateral U-test (thereafter MW)
p-value=0.409) while the average trust in the TTI treatment is signiﬁcantly
higher than in the two other treatments (MW, TTI vs. NI p-value=0.047, TTI
vs. TI p-value=0.047). With identiﬁcation (TI and TTI) the average reciprocity
is signiﬁcantly higher than without (MW, TI vs. NI p-value=0.066, TTI vs. NI
p-value=0.066). However the diﬀerence between treatments TI and TTI is not
signiﬁcant (MWU p-value=0.469).
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the average level of reciprocity for each treat-
ment. Identiﬁcation has a positive eﬀect on the reciprocity level at the beginning
of the game. In the ﬁrst period the average reciprocity is equal to 27.04% in
treatment NI, 36.03% in treatment TI and 32.80% in treatment TTI, respec-
tively. In treatments with identiﬁcation the average reciprocity in period 1 is
close to one third and is signiﬁcantly higher than in the NI treatment (MW NI
vs TI p-value=0.021, NI vs TTI p-value=0.032). There is no signiﬁcant diﬀer-
ence between the TI and the TTI treatments however (p-value=0.120). The
TI and TTI curves follow closely the same path, while the NI curve lies clearly
below the former ones. For purpose of comparison we divide the 30 periods
into three sequences of 10 periods each : an initial (or ﬁrst) sequence (periods































Figure 2: Evolution of trust for each treatment
1-10), an intermediary (or second) sequence (periods 11-20) and a ﬁnal sequence
(periods 21-30). In both treatments with identiﬁcation (TI and TTI) there are
two consecutive sequences in which the average reciprocity is not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent. This is not the case in the treatment NI. More precisely the averages
in the three sequences of treatment NI are respectively equal to 22.98%, 17.65%
and 11.52%. A Wilcoxon one-sided test shows that the average in sequence 1
is greater than in sequence 2 (p-value=0.031), the latter being greater than in
sequence 3 (p-value=0.016). In treatment TI the corresponding averages are
respectively equal to 29.64%, 24.45% and 23.25%. Averages in sequences 2 and
3 are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent (p-value=0.281), while the average in sequence 1
is signiﬁcantly higher than in sequence 2 (p-value=0.016). Finally in treatment
TTI the average reciprocity in sequences 1 and 2 are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
(p-value=0.219) while the average in sequence 3 is signiﬁcantly lower than in
sequence 2 (p-value=0.016). The average reciprocity thus evolves diﬀerently
in the three treatments : we observe a persistent decline in the NI treatment;
a decline between sequence 1 and 2 but not between 2 and 3, under trustees’
identiﬁcation, and a decline only in the ﬁnal sequence when both the trustor
and the trustee are identiﬁed. The average reciprocity in the NI treatment is
moreover always lower than in the other treatments (MW, initial sequence: NI
vs. TI p-value=0.032, NI vs. TTI p-value=0.032; intermediary sequence: NI
vs. TI p-value=0.090, NI vs. TTI p-value=0.013; and ﬁnal sequence: NI vs. TI
p-value=0.031, NI vs. TTI p-value=0.031). Between treatments TI and TTI
the three sequences do not exhibit a signiﬁcant diﬀerence (MW, p-value=0.409,
p-value=0.350, p-value=0.294 for each sequence respectively).
Figure 2 reports the evolution of average trust in the three treatments. In the
7ﬁrst period of play average trust is equal to 4.72 for the NI treatment, 4.33
for the TI treatment and 4.92 for the TTI treatment. These averages are not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent even if it apparently larger in the TTI treatment (MW, NI
vs. TI p-value=0.211, NI vs. TTI p-value=0.531, TI vs. TTI p-value=0.167).
However, average trust in the TTI treatment becomes larger very quickly with
respect to the two other treatments. Indeed, from period 2 average trust in
treatment TTI is slightly more than 50% of the endowment. The average in-
vestment stays at this level until period 20 of the game. Such a high level of
average trust is never reached in the other treatments. In the ﬁrst sequence
of the NI treatment average trust is 4.34, which is signiﬁcantly larger than in
the second sequence (4.03, Wilcoxon one-sided test p-value=0.047). There is
also a signiﬁcant decrease between the intermediary and the ﬁnal sequence (p-
value=0.078). In treatments TI and TTI we observe average trust in the ﬁrst
and second sequences is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent (Wilcoxon one-sided test, se-
quence 1 vs. sequence 2, TI p-value=0.156, TTI p-value=0.281) but falls in
the third sequence with respect to the second one (TI p-value=0.031, TTI p-
value=0.078). In treatment TTI the average trust in sequences 1 and 3 are also
not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from each other (p-value=0.109). Providing subjects
with the ability to identify who trusts them in the group has thus not only an
eﬀect on the average but also on the evolution over time. Both roles identiﬁca-
tion leads subjects to trust the others at a higher level and over a longer period
of time.
Even in a complete anonymous environment subjects exhibit trust and reci-
procity, as shown by many experimental papers. We found that this result also
holds in a population environment where subjects play simultaneously both roles
in the game. Following Kreps & al.’s arguments adding trustees’ identiﬁcation
in the population introduces a reputation mechanism that creates incentives for
trustees to be trustworthy. Knowing trustees’ incentive to reciprocate trustors’s
decisions, may increase the level of trust. We therefore conjectured that trustees’
identiﬁcation leads to higher levels of trust and reciprocity in the population.
As stated in result 1 trustees’ identiﬁcation has a signiﬁcantly positive eﬀect on
reciprocity but no eﬀect on trust. This positive eﬀect on reciprocity is present
in the very ﬁrst period of the repeated game, meaning that subjects take into
account the individual incentive to be trustworthy. The evolution of reciprocity
in the population is also aﬀected: without identiﬁcation reciprocity decreases
continuously over time, but remains at a high level when identiﬁcation is avail-
able. However the increase in average reciprocity is not suﬃcient for subjects
acting as trustor to become more trustful. We therefore conclude that the in-
troduction of incentives for trustworthiness is not enough for enhancing trust in
a population environment. Our results contrast with other ﬁndings in a ﬁxed-
pairs environment (Anderhub & al. 2002, Cochard & al. 2004). Two reasons
might explain the diﬀerence. First, trusting decisions in a population environ-
ment where only trustees are identiﬁed remain partially anonymous. In a ﬁxed
pairs, since the trustor interacts repeatedly with the same trustee, the trustor is
aware that his trustee observes his decisions. Therefore the pair is able to build
up a trust-reciprocity relationship. In a population environment with random
matching and anonymous trustors the trustee reacts mechanically according to
his incentives but is unable to observe the evolution of the trusting decisions of
his counterparts. Second, the trustor has only a weak control on the trustee’s













































Figure 3: Frequencies of each investment level, in the three treatments
decisions. Since subjects play both roles, under trustees’ identiﬁcation, trustors
have only a control on other members’ reciprocity decisions but not on their
trust decisions. A subject may therefore trust a counterpart who does not trust
him (or less), i.e. who does not contribute to the achievement of an eﬃcient
outcome for the pair. The second part of result 1 supports this interpretation:
adding trustors’ identiﬁcation leads to higher average trust in the population.
This positive eﬀect is present in the very ﬁrst period of play. Moreover aver-
age trust stays at a high level for most periods in contrast to treatments where
trustors’ identiﬁcation is not feasible.
3.2 Trust and reciprocity choices
Result 2:
(i) Equilibrium strategies are signiﬁcantly more frequently chosen un-
der complete anonymity,
(ii) ”Full trust” is signiﬁcantly more frequent when both roles are
identiﬁed,
(iii) Average reciprocity is positively correlated to the investment level
in all treatments.
Figure 3 reports the choice frequencies of each level of trust for the three
treatments. A one-sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov test performed on each pair of
treatments reveals that distributions do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly (NI vs. TI p-
value=0.441, NI vs. TTI p-value=0.441 and TI vs. TTI p-value=0.695). Nev-
ertheless one can obviously observe that in each treatment one strategy is more
frequently chosen than the others. In the NI treatment “no trust” (amount sent
equal to zero) is the most frequently chosen strategy (25.09%), this is higher











































































Figure 4: Frequencies of each reciprocity level, in the three treatments
than in the TI treatment (12.78%, MW p-value=0.064) and than in the TTI
treatment (13.61%, MW p-value=0.074). The most frequently chosen strategy
in the TI treatment corresponds to sending half of the endowment, which repre-
sents 18.15% of the choices. The corresponding frequency in the NI treatment is
11.30% which is signiﬁcantly less (MW p-value=0.067), and 13.52% in the TTI
treatment which is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from TI’s (MW p-value=0.131).
Finally, full trust (sending of the whole endowment) is the most frequently cho-
sen strategy in the TTI treatment and diﬀerences with the two other treatments
are signiﬁcant (MW, TTI vs NI p-value=0.010 and TTI vs TI p-value=0.071).
Figure 4 shows the frequencies of reciprocity decisions. In the NI treatment the
zero return strategy represents slightly more than 40% of the trustees’ decisions,
which is signiﬁcantly more than in the two treatments with identiﬁcation (TI:
21.34%, MW p-value=0.013 and TTI: 21.76%, MW p-value=0.013). Between
treatments TI and TTI the diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant (MW p-value=0.591). If





































Figure 5: Average reciprocity for each investment level, in the three treatments
the trustee returns at least one third of the amount received the trustor receives
a positive share of the surplus created by his investment decision. In the NI
treatment only 32.26% of the amounts returned by the trustees are equal or
larger than 1/3, which is signiﬁcantly less than in the treatments with iden-
tiﬁcation: 45.86% in the TI treatment (MW p-value=0.090) and 47.37 in the
TTI treatment (MW p-value=0.066). Identiﬁcation of one role is suﬃcient for
sharing the surplus since again the diﬀerence between the treatments with iden-
tiﬁcation is not signiﬁcant (MW p-value=0.469).
Figure 5 reports the average reciprocity for each trust level. In the three treat-
ments the Spearman correlation coeﬃcient between the investment levels and
the average reciprocity is signiﬁcantly positive (NI: 0.661 p-value=0.042, TI:
0.867 p-value=0.002 and TTI: 0.903 p-value=0.001). A Mann Whitney one-
sided test based on correlation coeﬃcients by groups reveals also that in the
TTI treatment the correlation is signiﬁcantly stronger than in the two other
treatments (TTI vs. NI p-value=0.013 and TTI vs. TI p-value=0.039), while
no such diﬀerence appears in the comparison between treatments NI and TI
(p-value=0.242). In the NI treatment none of the trust levels generates an av-
erage reciprocity at least equal to one third. In the TI treatment the average
reciprocity is close to one third for all levels of investment equal or larger than
half of the endowment. In the TTI treatment this is can be observed only for
very high investment levels (8 to 10).
The investment game has a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium: the trustor
keeps his entire endowment and the trustee never returns a positive amount if
he receives a positive amount. The equilibrium is ineﬃcient since it leads to
11a joint payoﬀ of 20 instead of 40 if the trustor sends his whole endowment. If
players interact randomly in both roles with each other there is no individual
incentive to be trustworthy and consequently trustors have no reason to send
positive amounts. As a consequence equilibrium strategies are signiﬁcantly more
frequently chosen by subjects leading more frequently to the most ineﬃcient
outcome. On the other hand, with trustees’ identiﬁcation, players acting as
trustee have an incentive to build up a trustworthy reputation since it may
inﬂuence the trustor’s future attitude towards them. As expected trustees’
identiﬁcation not only leads to higher average reciprocity as stated by result
1, but also to fewer choices of equilibrium strategies and more surplus-sharing.
Our interpretation is that trustees understand the incentive to behave in a
trustworthy way when their decisions are privately observed by counterparts
with whom they are likely to interact in future periods. However, it is only when
they are identiﬁed as well that trustors act in a more eﬃcient way, in particular
“full trust” (sending the whole endowment). Once again two interpretations are
possible : (i) trustors believe that trust is less risky since they have a greater
control on their counterpart’s decisions, and (ii) trustors signal their cooperative
intentions in order to achieve the social optimum in the pair.
3.3 Individual decisions
Kovacs (2006) shows that reciprocity decisions of a subject is positively cor-
related to the trust he exhibits. In their experimental protocol subjects par-
ticipates to a one-shot investment game. Before role assignment in the game
(trustor or trustee), subjects have to answer a questionnaire in which they must
state how much they would send if they would play the role of trustor in the
game and for each amount received (0, 3, 6, ..., 27, 30) how much they would
return if they would play the role of trustee. Based on this strategy method the
author shows that more trustful subjects are also more trustworthy. Since our
subjects play both roles in the game, we can also test if their trust decisions are
related to their reciprocity decisions.
A central hypothesis about trustees’ identiﬁcation is that trustors can condition
the amount sent on the trustee’s type. Is it the case that more trustworthy
subjects are more trusted than untrustworthy ones? When both roles are iden-
tiﬁed, subjects can condition the amount sent on the trustors’ type : are trustful
subjects more trusted than untrustful ones?
Result 3: There is a strong correlation between :
(i) own average trust and own average reciprocity in all treatments,
(ii) the received amount and average reciprocity under trustees’ iden-
tiﬁcation,
(iii) the received amount and average trust under trustors’ and trustees’
identiﬁcation.
Figure 6 illustrates the relation between own average trust and own reciprocity.
More precisely, for the 36 subjects in each treatment we report subjects’ own av-
erage trust and own average reciprocity (in percentage of the amount received).
In the three treatments there is a signiﬁcantly positive correlation between sub-
jects’ own average trust and average reciprocity. The Spearman correlation
coeﬃcients are respectively equal to 0.386 (p-value=0.020) in the NI treatment,









































































































Figure 6: Average reciprocity and average investment of the 36 subjects, in the
three treatments









































































































Figure 7: Average reciprocity and average observed investment of the 36 sub-
jects, in the three treatments
0.363 (p-value=0.029) in the TI treatment and 0.558 (p-value<0.001) in the
TTI treatment. A Mann Whitney test performed on the average correlation
coeﬃcients per groups reveals that the intensity of the correlation is not sig-
niﬁcantly diﬀerent between treatments (NI vs. TI p-value=0.235, NI vs. TTI
p-value=0.315 and TI vs. TTI p-value=0.131). This result is in line with Ko-
vacs’ (2006).
Figure 7 reports, for each treatment, each subject’s average reciprocity and av-
erage trust placed in them. In the NI treatment subjects cannot condition their
trusting decision on the trustee’s reciprocity in past periods. In contrast, in the
TI and TTI treatments, trustors have at their disposal private records of their
past interactions with each trustee. In the NI treatment the Spearman corre-
lation coeﬃcient between subjects’ average level they have been trusted and
average reciprocity is equal to -0.014, which is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from









































































































Figure 8: Average observed investment and average investment of the 36 sub-
jects, in the three treatments
zero (p-value=0.936). In the TI and TTI treatments the Spearman correlation
coeﬃcients are respectively equal to 0.698 and 0.661, both are signiﬁcantly dif-
ferent from zero (p-value<0.001 in both cases). These two coeﬃcients are not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from each other (MW p-value=0.5). Hence, as expected,
reciprocal subjects are more trusted when trustees’ identiﬁcation is feasible,
meaning that trustors eﬀectively condition their trusting decision on trustees’
observed behavior.
We conjectured that under double identiﬁcation a positive relation exists be-
tween subject own trust and trust placed in him by the others. Because subjects
can identify each other in both roles, a given subject may be more trustful with
respect to a member of his group who was trustful to him. Reciprocating trust
by trust for a given pair of subjects increases the long term eﬃciency of their
relationship. Figure 8 reports, for each treatment, each subject’s average trust
15level and average trust placed in him. In the NI and TI treatments subjects are
trusted anonymously, therefore there is no reason for more trustful players to
be more trusted. The Spearman correlation coeﬃcients are respectively equal
to 0.281 (p-value=0.096) in the NI treatment2, 0.200 (p-value=0.242) in the
TI treatment and 0.793 (p-value<0.001) in the TTI treatment supporting the
conjecture.
As claimed in the introduction of this subsection an important question when
subjects play both roles in the investment game is whether subjects’ decisions
are correlated, that is whether a trustworthy subject is also a trustful subject
and conversely. Our data provides positive support for this intra-personal rela-
tionship for all treatments. Another important question is related to the eﬀects
of identiﬁcation on individual decisions. Trustees’ identiﬁcation in the popula-
tion introduces a reputation mechanism in the repeated game. Since trustees
are observed in their reciprocity decision they have an incentive to be recip-
rocal for matched group members to keep on placing trust in them. But this
supposes that trustors eﬀectively condition the trust they place in a trustee to
the latter’s history of play. For measuring this conditional behavior we have
analyzed the correlation between the average reciprocity of a subject and the
average level he has been trusted. Both correlation coeﬃcients in treatments TI
and TTI are in line with the hypothesis. Hence it is in the interest of trustees
to be reciprocal when they are individually identiﬁed in the population because
subjects condition their trust decision on the observed trustworthy behavior in
previous interactions. When players are identiﬁed in the population both as
trustee and as trustor, conditional behavior based on trustworthy past behavior
but also on past trustfulness behavior is possible. Do subjects condition also
the trust they place in a group member in the latter’s trust decision in previous
interactions? Once again the answer is positive so that we can conclude that in
a repeated trust situation where individual decisions are privately observed by
matched players, “cooperative” behavior lead to be more trusted.
3.4 Trust-reciprocity relationships
According to our results identiﬁcation plays an important role in the emergence
of trust relationships. In particular it allows trustors to condition the current
amount sent on their counterpart’s history of play and expected behavior in
future interactions. This possibility to condition one’s trust according to the
person with whom one is matched means that in the population trust-reciprocity
relationships emerged for some pairs of subjects while such relations failed to
built up for other pairs. We identify such trust-reciprocity relationships between
subjects based on the following deﬁnition: a trust-reciprocity relationship be-
tween trustor i and trustee j is formed if and only if both players obtain on
average a positive (net) proﬁt from their interaction. The (net) proﬁt for a
trustor in period t is the amount he gets back less the amount he has initially
sent to the trustee, and the (net) proﬁt for a trustee in period t is the amount
received from i less the amount returned to i. Taking the average proﬁt im-
plies that the relation between players may have evolved over time. It does not
2The correlation coeﬃcient is based on individual averages. If we agregate the correlation
coeﬃcients at the group level, the average correlation in the NI treatment is equal to -0.631.
16Treatment si,ij rj,ij πi,ij πj,ij Frequency (%)
Failure
NI 3.81 10.53 -2.43 10.05 76.54
TI 3.76 15.76 -1.75 9.26 68.33
TTI 3.95 15.12 -1.92 9.83 66.48
Success
NI 3.59 45.85 1.43 5.75 23.46
TI 4.78 44.07 1.61 7.95 31.67
TTI 6.70 40.70 2.00 11.40 33.52
Table 2: Trust-reciprocity relationships that failed and those that succeeded,
for each treatment
impose a positive proﬁt each period players have interacted together (with i as
trustor and j as trustee). Notice that the relation is “trust-oriented”. Since
players have both roles in the game, a given pair of players may form zero, one
or two trust-reciprocity relations. Formally, we consider (ex-post) that a trust-
















(3sij,τ × (1 − rji,τ)) ≥ 0
subject to sij > 0
(1)
where n is the number of periods players i and j have interacted together, with
i as trustor and j as trustee, sij,τ is the amount sent by i to j in period τ and
rji,τ is the reciprocity (in percentage of the (positive) received amount) return
by j to i in period τ.
Result 4:
(i) Trustees’ identiﬁcation increases the frequency of trust-reciprocity
relationships in the population,
(ii) Trustors’ and trustees’ identiﬁcation lead to higher trust level in
the trust-reciprocity relationships between population members
Table 2 reports, for relations that have failed and those that have succeeded
according to our deﬁnition, the frequency of occurrences, average trust, average
reciprocity and the average (net) proﬁt for each treatment (see table 6 in the ap-
pendix for the detailed statistical tests inter-treatments and intra-treatment). In
each treatment 180 relations (36 players that can form 5 relations each) can po-
tentially be formed if every subject in a group interacts with each other subject
in both roles. In the NI and TTI treatments one subject who acted as trustor
never met one of the members of his group. Therefore for these treatments
the total number of possible links is only 179 instead of 180. In the NI treat-
ment since subjects cannot form links voluntarily the observed links are “chance
17Treatment si,ij rj,ij πi,ij πj,ij Frequency (%)
Unilateral
NI 3.42 45.90 1.42 5.42 85.71
TI 4.53 45.39 1.79 7.28 68.42
TTI 5.13 38.30 1.18 9.08 40.00
Bilateral
NI 6.09 47.33 1.87 10.30 14.29
TI 5.92 42.52 1.62 10.23 31.58
TTI 7.52 44.91 2.71 12.32 60.00
Table 3: Trust-reciprocity unilateral and bilateral relationships, for each treat-
ment
links”. 23.46% of the links that could potentially be formed have been eﬀec-
tively formed in the NI treatment, it is less than in the TI treatment (31.67%,
χ2=3.024 p-value=0.082) and less than in the TTI treatment (33.52%, χ2=4.442
p-value=0.035). In the relations that failed to form the average trust in the three
treatments is quite similar (MW, p-value=0.409 in the three comparisons). In
the NI treatment the average trust is not higher in formed links compared to
unformed one (Wilcoxon one-sided test p-value=0.281), supporting the hypoth-
esis that links are randomly formed. In both environments with identiﬁcation
trustors can voluntarily establish a trust relationship. In these treatments the
average trust when link formation succeeded is signiﬁcantly higher compared
to the average trust when it failed (Wilcoxon one-sided test TI p-value=0.031,
TTI p-value=0.016). With both roles identiﬁcation the average trust in the
formed links is even higher than with trustee’s role identiﬁcation only (MW
p-value=0.013). Trustor’s role identiﬁcation has thus a positive impact on trust
between players. However, as previously shown, this positive eﬀect only con-
cerns trust, not reciprocity. The latter is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent in treatment
TI compared to treatment TTI (p-value=0.350). Finally, in treatments NI and
TI the average net proﬁt of the trustees is signiﬁcantly higher in unformed-
links (Wilcoxon one-sided test, NI p-value=0.016 and TI p-value=0.016) while
in treatment TTI this proﬁt is higher in formed-links, even if the diﬀerence is
not signiﬁcant (Wilcoxon p-value=0.109).
Among the formed links we distinguish unilateral and bilateral ones. A bilat-
eral relation in the pair corresponds to the existence of two unilateral links.
Table 3 reports, for unilateral and bilateral relations, the frequency of occur-
rences, the average trust, the average reciprocity and the average (net) proﬁt
for each treatment (see table 7 for the detailed statistical tests inter-treatments
and intra-treatment).
Result 5:
(i) Both roles identiﬁcation lead to a higher frequency of bilateral re-
lations formation
(ii) In bilateral relations formed voluntarily (TTI treatment), average
trust, average reciprocity, average net proﬁt of trustors and average
net proﬁt of trustees are higher than in unilateral relations.
Since in the NI and TI treatments bilateral links cannot be voluntarily estab-
18lished there is no reason for average trust to be higher in bilateral relations than
in unilateral relations. In both treatments the average trust in bilateral relations
is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the average in unilateral ones (Wilcoxon one-
sided test, NI: p-value=0.500 and TI p-value=0.125). In the TTI treatment bi-
lateral relationships can be deliberately created between population’s members.
60% of the observed links are bilateral which is signiﬁcantly more than in the NI
and in the TI treatment (NI: 14.29% χ2=21.32 p-value<0.001 and TI: 31.58%,
χ2=9.5 p-value=0.002). Average trust in bilateral relationships is higher than
in unilateral ones (7.52 against 5.13), a signiﬁcant diﬀerence (p-value=0.063).
Average reciprocity is signiﬁcantly higher in bilateral than in unilateral relations
only in the TTI treatment (Wilcoxon one-sided test p-value=0.063). Although
trustors’ identiﬁcation does not aﬀect average reciprocity at the population level
(result 1) it does so in bilateral relationships. Therefore, the average net proﬁt of
subjects acting as trustor in the TTI treatment is signiﬁcantly higher in bilateral
relations than in unilateral relations (Wilcoxon one-sided test p-value=0.031),
which is not the case in the other treatments (p-value=0.250 and 0.313 respec-
tively in treatment NI and TI). The average net proﬁt of subjects acting as
trustee is also higher in bilateral relations in the TTI treatment (Wilcoxon one-
sided test p-value=0.061).
The understanding of endogenous formation of linked-by-trust relationships be-
tween agents is a challenge for future research. Our experimental design pro-
vides some insights about such relationships. The criterion we have adopted
for identifying trust-reciprocity relationships between individuals is close to the
one used in the literature related to endogenous network formation (see Jackson
& Wolinsky 1996). Based on this criterion our experimental data show that
identiﬁcation is a key feature for trust-reciprocity relationships to emerge. As
expected trustees’ identiﬁcation leads subjects to form unilateral links. In these
links the average trust is higher than in relations that have failed to form. But
more interestingly we observe the formation of mutual trust-reciprocity rela-
tionships. In treatment TTI where players identify each other in both roles,
mutual link formation is possible. The analyzes show that in these bilateral
links average trust and average reciprocity are both signiﬁcantly higher than in
unilateral links and of course higher than in relations that have failed to form.
3.5 Dynamic of individual decisions
Trustees’ identiﬁcation in a population of player involved in a repeated social
dilemma generates a reputation mechanism. Such a mechanism provides incen-
tives to be reciprocal and produces information to players about decisions taken
in previous interactions. In this section we rely on a panel data analysis to
capture the dynamics of subjects’ decisions and to identify variables that aﬀect
trust and reciprocity. Without identiﬁcation (treatment NI) subjects have no
private information about past decisions taken by the group member they inter-
act with in the current period. Subjects only know a “global” history of play:
the average observed trust and the average observed reciprocity in the popu-
lation. Of course they also know how much they sent, received and returned
since the beginning of the game. A subject’s current decision can therefore only
be inﬂuenced by his own past decisions and by global decisions observed in the
population. In the TI treatment where only trustees are identiﬁed, reciprocity
19decisions are inﬂuenced by the same variables than in the NI treatment. How-
ever, subjects know that they are individually observed. In contrast the current
trust decision can be conditioned on past interactions with the current oppo-
nent. Finally in the TTI treatment subjects know the past trusting decisions
and reciprocity decisions of their current opponent as well as their own past
decisions with him. To what extent, does this additional available information
condition their trust decision and/or their reciprocity decision?
We estimate a separate model for trust decisions and for reciprocity decisions,
independently for each treatment. Equation (2) corresponds to the estimated
model for trust decisions in the NI treatment.
sit = α + β1si + β23sj + β3ri + β4rj + β5πi + uit (2)
where si = 1
t−1 ×
Pt−1
l=1 sil is the average amount sent by i since the beginning
of the game, 3sj = 1
t−1 ×
Pt−1
l=1 3sjl is the average amount received by i in
previous periods, ri = 1
t−1 ×
Pt−1
l=1 ril is i’s average reciprocity from the ﬁrst
period to period t − 1, rj = 1
t−1 ×
Pt−1
l=1 rjl is the average reciprocity observed
by i i.e. the average reciprocity of players j player i has trusted since the ﬁrst
period, π = 1
t−1 ×
Pt−1
l=1 πil is the average gain per period of player i, with
πit = 10 − sit + rjt × 3sit + 3sjt(1 − rit), and uit = µi + εit with µi an eﬀect
speciﬁc to i and εit an idiosyncratic error term (εit ∼ N(0,σ2
i)).
For the TI treatment we introduce two additional independent variables: the
average amount sent to the current opponent in previous interactions (sij) and
the latter’s average reciprocity (rji). The model is given in (3).
sit = α + β1si + β23sj + β3ri + β4rj + β5πi + β6sij + β7rji + uit (3)
For the TTI treatment we introduce two more independent variables which refer
to the behavior of the current opponent acting as trustor in previous interac-
tions: the average received amount from him (3sji) and the average reciprocity
toward him (rij). The model is given in (4).
sit =α + β1si + β23sj + β3ri + β4rj + β5πi + β6sij + β7rji + β83sji + β9rij
+ uit
(4)
Table 4 reports the estimates for each treatment3. For the NI treatment sub-
jects’ trust choices are positively aﬀected by their own average past trust (si),
their own average past reciprocity (ri) and the average reciprocity observed in
the population (rj). However the average amount received (3sj) has no impact
on their trusting decision, meaning that own trust is independent from other
subjects’ trusting decisions. The constant is signiﬁcant and negative, corre-
sponding to the strong decrease over time. Several diﬀerences appear in the
3Estimations have been performed with the xtreg Stata’s command. In all the models es-
timations revealed some heteroscedasticity and ﬁrst order auto-correlation we have corrected.
Estimations for (2) revealed the existence of random individual eﬀects (pooled versus indi-
vidual eﬀects test and Hausman test). The other estimations ( (3), (4), (5) and (6)) revealed
individual ﬁxed eﬀects.
20NI TI TTI
si 0.773*** -0.256* -0.481*
(0.063) (0.152) (0.269)
3si 0.027 0.222 0.031
(0.055) (0.135) (0.215)
ri 0.023** 0.038 0.084
(0.012) (0.032) (0.063)
rj 0.044*** 0.018 0.077
(0.011) (0.030) (0.050)










const. -2.535*** -1.409 -1.914
(0.813) (1.786) (3.261)
Wald χ2(5)=401.74 F(7,852)=321.61 F(9,730)=42.64
prob> χ2=0.000 prob>F=0.000 prob>F=0.000
*** signiﬁcant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level
Table 4: Trust decision’s dynamic for each treatment
regressions for the TI and TTI treatments. Two variables are no longer sig-
niﬁcant: subjects’ own past average reciprocity and past average reciprocity
observed in the population. The reason is that subjects rely on their available
private information about past decisions of their current trustee : the average
amount they sent to him (sij) and the latter’s average reciprocity (rji). Both
variables have a positive impact on their current level of trust. This conﬁrms
result 3 which stated that if identiﬁcation is feasible subjects condition their
trust decision on the trustee’s reciprocity decisions. As for the NI treatment,
others’ trusting decisions do not aﬀect the subject’s own trust. Under both
roles identiﬁcation, subjects also condition their trust in a group member on
the latter’s trust toward themselves. This favors the formation of bilateral links
between some subjects in the population and explains the positive impact of
these variables on eﬃciency in mutual trust relationships.
Explanatory variables of individual reciprocity decisions are captured by the
model in expression (5) for the NI and the TI treatments, since subjects ob-
serve the same variables in these two treatments. The treatments diﬀer how-
ever because in TI subjects acting as trustee know that they are observed by the
trustor. Since the reciprocity decision is taken after the trust decision within
a period, we introduce as independent variables the amount sent at the begin-
21NI TI TTI
si 1.346*** 0.315 0.856***
(0.269) (0.223) (0.222)
3sj 0.294*** 0.273*** 0.406***
(0.069) (0.074) (0.111)
si 0.695 0.429 0.830
(1.010) (0.684) (1.327)
3si -0.642 -0.832 -1.456
(0.734) (0.738) (1.674)
ri 0.395** 0.464** 0.314
(0.200) (0.207) (0.460)
rj 0.007 0.203 0.409
(0.113) (0.182) (0.401)










const. -12.212 -8.76 -14.510
(13.242) (10.992) (22.141)
Wald F(7,703)=9.52 F(7,859)=8.00 F(11,605)=28.02
prob>F=0.000 prob>F=0.000 prob>F=0.000
*** signiﬁcant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level
Table 5: Reciprocity decision’s dynamic for each treatment
ning of the current period (sit) and of course the amount received (3sjt). In
the TTI treatment, subjects know the average trust of their opponent in past
interactions and their own average reciprocity towards him. They also know the
average level they trusted him in the past and the latter’s average reciprocity
towards themselves. The model for the TTI treatment is given in (6).
rit = α + β1sit + β23sjt + β3si + β43sj + β5ri + β6rj + β7πi + uit (5)
rit =α + β1sit + β23sjt + β3si + β43sj + β5ri + β6rj + β7πi
+ β83sji + β9rij + β10sij + β11rji + uit
(6)
Table 5 reports the estimates for models (5) and (6). In all treatments subjects’
reciprocity is without surprise positively aﬀected by the amount received. In
the NI and TI treatments the reciprocity decision is positively aﬀected by the
22subject’s past average reciprocity but not in the TTI treatment. In the NI
treatment the decision is also positively aﬀected by the level of trust chosen in
the current period, but not in the TI treatment. In the TTI treatment two
variables have a positive eﬀect on the current reciprocity choice: 3sji, average
trust in past interactions of the current opponent, and rji, his average past
reciprocity. The subject’s own average past reciprocity towards his opponent
(rij), and the subject’s own average trust towards him (sij) are not signiﬁcant.
Hence, under both roles identiﬁcation subjects refer more to the paired player’s
past decisions than to their own behavior in previous periods. Once again this
conﬁrms result 3 about conditional behavior as well as results 4 and 5 about the
formation of mutual trust-reciprocity relationships. While these models shed
some light about the dynamics of decisions in the population, future research
should focus on the learning process inside pairs, by allowing subjects to interact
more frequently together and over a longer period of time.
4 Conclusion
The aim of our paper was to investigate trusting and trustworthy behavior in a
setting close to many real life situations. We implemented therefore several key
features of trust relationships that characterize trust in a population : repeti-
tion, randomness and experience in both roles (trustee and trustor). Our main
interest is in the eﬀects of role identiﬁcation. Indeed, trustees’ role identiﬁca-
tion is a necessary condition for a reputation mechanism to be introduced in the
repeated game. Cochard & al. (2004) and Anderhub & al. (2002) showed that
repetition favors both trust and reciprocity in ﬁxed pair of players. In these pa-
pers players’ identiﬁcation is exogenous, since at the beginning of the repeated
game, players know that they will always interact with the same partner and
observe the decisions of the matched player.
Our aim was to isolate trustees’ identiﬁcation in a population where players en-
counters are random. We found that trustees’ identiﬁcation as such, positively
aﬀects average reciprocity but has no impact on trust itself. Even if identiﬁed
trustees have a stronger incentive to be reciprocal, it is not suﬃcient for trustors
to become more trustworthy. However, with both roles identiﬁcation trust and
reciprocity in the population increase compared to complete anonymity. Fur-
thermore, playing both roles and being identiﬁed in each role allows players to
built up self-enforcing bilateral trust-reciprocity relationships. We showed that
such relations lead to higher trustfulness and higher trustworthiness for linked
players and, as a consequence, to more eﬃcient outcomes.
Simultaneity of both roles might have aﬀected our results. Therefore, we in-
tend in future research to investigate the eﬀects of alternating roles. Another
interesting extension is to make past trust and/or reciprocity decisions public
information. Finally, the population size and the number of periods might have
aﬀected our results. It would be therefore of interest to check the robustness of
our ﬁndings with respect to these dimensions.
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MW, relations
that failed
NI vs. TI 0.409 0.013 0.066 0.294
NI vs. TTI 0.409 0.013 0.155 0.531
TI vs. TTI 0.409 0.531 0.350 0.409
MW, relations
that succeeded
NI vs. TI 0.047 0.409 0.350 0.032
NI vs. TTI 0.002 0.242 0.242 0.001
TI vs. TTI 0.013 0.350 0.197 0.004
Table 6: Statistical tests on trust-reciprocity relationships
Test si,ij rj,ij πi,ij πj,ij
(p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value)
Wilcoxon
one-sided
NI uni. vs. NI bi. 0.500 0.750 0.250 0.500
TI uni. vs. TI bi. 0.125 0.063 0.313 0.063
TTI uni. vs. TTI bi. 0.063 0.063 0.031 0.063
MW, unilateral
relationships
NI vs. TI 0.047 0.469 0.242 0.047
NI vs. TTI 0.021 0.090 0.531 0.004
TI vs. TTI 0.242 0.047 0.155 0.047
MW, bilateral
relationships
NI vs. TI 0.733 0.267 0.400 0.600
NI vs. TTI 0.286 0.429 0.286 0.286
TI vs. TTI 0.206 0.365 0.143 0.143
Table 7: Statistical tests on unilateral and bilateral trust-reciprocity relation-
ships
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